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Pyrotechnic devices are commonly used for space vehicle staging and separation events.
These devices are inherently single-use mechanisms that lead to the inability to test and
demonstrate failure tolerant performance of actual flight articles.
Historically, NASA has implemented a single failure tolerant philosophy for highly
critical functions.
The frangible joint is a low weight off-the-shelf system that separates spacecraft
structure without generating debris and it induces a lower shock level to the
vehicle when fired.
The frangible joints commercially available today are zero failure tolerant  and do 
not provide functional redundancy.
All frangible joints have been used in unmanned spacecraft to date, however, they have
been selected for use on the Orion and commercial partners’ vehicles.
This presentation discusses the internal development of a single failure tolerant joint design 
through collaboration of the JSC Engineering and Safety & Mission Assurance organizations.
Applications of Spacecraft 
Separation Events
Introduction
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AfterBefore
Frangible Joint Functioning
Frangible Joint assembly (FJA) 
before  vehicle installation.
Larger FJAs consist of several arc 
shapes to make a circle.
Frangible Joint Operation
Frangible Joint Description
The frangible joint has an expansion tube assembly (XTA), which is installed along the length of 
the joint separation plane.  The XTA consists of a steel tube that has been flattened to create 
two flat sides, and within the tube are the explosive cord and a charge holder.  The charge 
holder serves to center the cord in the tube and also transmits shock energy to the joint when 
fired.  When the cord is detonated, the tube returns to a round shape and fractures structure 
along the expansion path.  The XTA then contains all debris generated from this event.
These designs are zero failure tolerant.
AfterBefore
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Below are 2 of many cases where linear explosives have failed
Shuttle Overhead Window Jettison Qualification Test Shuttle Flexible Confined detonating Cord (FCDC) Failure
• After a successful jettison of the outer window during a
qualification test, inspection revealed that one of the mild
detonating fuse (MDF) lines had not fired as planned.
• The root cause of the failure remains unknown. Complete
functionality of the system was achieved only through
implementation of redundancy.
• During safing following Shuttle retirement, these lines were
functioned in place due to the extensive efforts required for
complete removal.
• One of the caps did not swell as expected indicating that the line
did not fully function.
• Functionality would not have been compromised due to the
redundant design.
Pyrotechnic Component Failures
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• NASA JSC’s Safety and Engineering organizations teamed up to develop a new design that is fully 
redundant.
• The Flat H design consist of two XTA’s that act on one separation plane.
• Models were created to assess adequacy of designs.
Flat H Redundant Frangible Joint Assembly and Functioning
Flat H Redundant Frangible Joint Design
AfterBefore
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• In early 2014, the Propulsion and Power 
Division funded the first proof of concept 
testing for 3 assemblies. 
• Testing showed positive results.
• Later in 2014, NASA Headquarters funded 
additional testing both at JSC and White 
Sands Test Facility (WSTF). This design was 
modified to fit Orion’s Panel Separation.
• Testing showed mixed results between the 
JSC and WSTF results.
• Further testing was completed with larger 
explosive cord sizes, but problems remained 
with the design when tested at WSTF. Proof of Concept Testing
Early Testing
Mixed Results
Initial Flat H Frangible Joint Testing 
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• Many lessons were learned from these initial 
test efforts.
• One big design factor that was not considered a 
risk was the diameters of the holes and the 
bolts attaching the parts together.
• Hole diameters were bigger in these parts than 
the original proof of concept test articles.
• The variation was known, but could not be 
changed prior to the WSTF testing.
• Upon firing, with larger explosive cord loads, 
the joint failed to separate.
• After analyzing the test data it was noticed that 
there was movement between the plate and 
spacers.
• The movement led to energy loss and greatly 
reduced the energy directed directed toward 
plate breakage.
Spacer/Plate Slippage caught on High Speed Video
SpacerPlate
Initial Flat-H Lessons Learned
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Large amounts of data were analyzed to determine what may have contributed to the failure.
Positional data revealed that there was movement between joint components.
Pretest Photo to Illustrate Data Locations
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White Sands Testing
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To prevent slippage, keyways were cut into the 
parts.
Geometry changes also made to gain efficiency.
Following tests showed successful separation 
with the lower explosive cord size.
Updates Design for 2015 Tests 2015 Test Results
Flat-H Forward Plan
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• Seek additional funding to continue the development 
activity.
• Demonstrate feasibility of rolling process.
• Procure notch curved sections for combined load tests.
• Examine functionality with full length test articles.
• Continue to perfect analytical models to achieve better 
predictive test results.
Forward Work
Curved Flat-H 
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Flat-H Funding History 
2014 Flat- H Initial Funding by NASA HQ 
provided:
• Energetic Systems Test Area Tests
• Structural Load Test
• Compression 
• Tensile 
• WSTF 4 Functional Tests 
2015 Additional Flat-H Funding from the JSC Innovation Fund, 
JSC Center Innovation Fund (JTWG), and the JSC EP Division 
showed a strong advocacy for long-term solution and provided:
• WSTF 2 Functional Tests 
• In-house LS Dyna Modeling and Analysis
• Energetic Systems Test Area Functional Tests
• Load Tests
Flat-H Forward Plan 
• Demonstrate promising Flat-H Design Solution   
• Seek funding to emulate Orion vehicle geometry 
• Buy down future risks early in development
• Qualification of a flight design
Flat-H Success Story
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Conclusions
Core Design Philosophy:  A single failure tolerant Flat-H frangible joint 
technology with increased reliability, available for potential use on all 
human-rated space vehicles starting with Orion Exploration Mission 3,  
that assures crew safety, and that controls the risk of untestable frangible 
device failures resulting from:
• Improper installation, 
• Poor handling methods,
• Deficient procedures,
• Inadequate manufacturing methods,
• Substandard materials, 
• Faulty workmanship.
Conclusion 
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